Sixty-seven years ago, 19 February 1945, Marines of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions assaulted a horrible looking, other-worldly volcano called Iwo Jima. The 3rd Marine Division joined the battle soon after. They were there for the airfields. It would take them thirty-six days and more than twenty-six thousand casualties to do it.

The next 36 days were a collective nightmare for those who endured any portion of it. Doctrine of the day dictated that the landing force be three times the size of the defending enemy force, and it was well that they did so for, on Iwo Jima, the Marines suffered more casualties than they inflicted on the enemy, for the only time during the war. In fact, the Marines suffered more casualties (26,000) in one month, on this one island, than there were Japanese defenders (23,000).

The two-mile long landing beach, the only one usable as such, had been the focus of every defensive measure taken by the Japanese defenders. General Kuribayashi, a well respected veteran of the Imperial Guard, oversaw preparations for a defense in depth, parting with the crust-defense that had been the Japanese trademark so many times thus far in the war.

Kuribayashi sought to utilize Iwo’s rugged terrain and the unprecedented cave and tunnel system that had been constructed below the surface, to extract the highest possible toll on the attackers. As a result, there were no front lines on Iwo Jima. Every inch of the island, from the landing beach inland, had been pre-registered by artillery and mortars, or covered by mutually-supporting automatic weapons…and a gratuitous number of dual-purpose anti-aircraft positions, which exacted a gruesome toll on the Marines themselves.

Very few Marines ever saw a live enemy soldier. Veterans have said that the only way to locate the enemy was to get shot at. Hidden cave and tunnel openings were everywhere. One Marine, Dale Cook, of the 4th Marine Division, used the term “giant moon rocks” to describe the terrain around Hill 382…an area dubbed “The Meatgrinder.” Manuever as a unit was impossible. After jump-off, units splintered into small groups of two’s or three’s, and it was common for them to become separated from each other…some “lost.” Kuribayashi’s defensive plan was working to its maximum potential.

Marines advanced during daylight, then halted by late afternoon to consolidate, dig in, load up with grenades, and wait for the night. Only at night did the Japanese emerge from underground, crawling into foxholes with knives, to engage the attackers hand-to-hand, and to find desperately needed water. There was no natural water source on Iwo Jima, and their water system had been destroyed during the 72-day long pre-invasion bombing campaign. What one finds today in the tunnels of Iwo Jima, is often a host of empty saki bottles and a US GI water can with the bottom now rusted out.

The Japanese moved at night. And, unlike the careless and casual depiction in recent films of Iwo Jima, the Marines did not move at night, nor did they stand around, or smoke cigarettes to give away their position.

Perhaps the most hated duty in the Central Pacific was clearing caves. It could be said that nearly the entire fight on Iwo Jima was precisely this duty. Combat on Saipan and Guam had prepared the Marines for the coordinated assaults necessary to reduce these mutually-supporting strongholds, though the number and magnitude of these on Iwo Jima was beyond imagination. Rifle teams worked to locate, then neutralize an enemy cave or position while an assault team, with demolitions or flame-thrower, moved close enough to reduce it. Time after time, this was done. But, all too often, the Japanese occupiers had moved underground to an adjoining position. An explosion up front might emit smoke from openings in the ground to the rear. In the end, it was more expedient to blow a cave’s opening, or bulldoze it shut, instead of clearing its occupants. As a result, half the island’s defenders are there, still closed up inside Iwo Jima.

Thoughts:

As chaotic and brutal as the battle was, the Marines prevailed. Iwo Jima represents the hallmark of the Marine Corps, and is the benchmark by which all subsequent operations are judged.

It is commonly stated that Iwo Jima was taken to serve as an emergency landing strip for B-29s flying the circuit from the Marianas to Japan, 1200 miles each way. And it is also pointed out that taking Iwo Jima would eliminate interferance in those bombing missions by Japanese fighters operating from Iwo Jima, and the early warning afforded by its radar. But it is rarely understood that seizing Iwo Jima also served to bring those key air bases at Saipan, Tinian, and Guam to their full operational capacity, no longer hamstrung by Japanese air raids as they had been. General Curtis LeMay, the fiery commander of the 21st Bomber Command, pointed out that, once the Marines took Iwo Jima, air raids on American bases ceased, and they were then free to operate around the clock, under fully lit conditions at night. The result was that flight hours doubled or even tripled, and the operational tempo, so critical in the Pacific War at this stage, was significantly advanced.